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Abstract
We study Nash-rationalizable joint choice behavior under restriction on zero-
sum games. We show that interchangeability of choice behavior is the only
additional condition which distinguishes zero-sum games from general non-
cooperative games with respect to testable implications. This observation
implies that in some sense interchangeability is not only a necessary but also
a sufficient property which differentiates zero-sum games.
1 Introduction
Sprumont (2000) investigates an abstract joint choice problem without assuming an ex-
plicit economic environment. He assumes that the joint behavior is simultaneous and
is captured as a tuple of actions where each action is chosen by a player. Sprumont
provides conditions on the testable implications such that observed joint behavior is a
Nash equilibrium behavior if and only if it satisfies these conditions. They are similar to
classical axioms of choice theory (see Moulin (1985)).
We retain Sprumont’s basic abstract setup and ask the following question: “Is the
choice function Nash-rationalizable with a certain game, specifically, zero-sum games?”.
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Zero-sum games have been studied since game theoretic research began. They are still
considered important since they model a pure conflict of interest and admit a large variety
of applications (for example, the resource division problem). Thus, in addition to the
behavioral conditions implied by Nash-rationalizability, we may need other conditions to
ensure that the joint choice function is in fact rationalized by a zero-sum game. As an
introductory example, Figure 1 shows how Nash-rationalizable choice behavior may not
be able to be rationalized by a zero-sum game.1
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Figure 1: Nash-rationalizable but not with zero-sum games
In this example, player 1 can conceivably choose either U or D and player 2 may
choose L or R. However, following classical choice theory, we observe how players choose
when choice sets are restricted. Figure 1 shows all the possible games from which two
players may choose their joint actions. For each game, ∗ is the action profile chosen
by two players. We can verify that the joint choice behavior exhibited in Figure 1 is
consistent with Nash equilibrium behavior of a coordination game in which coordinating
to (U,L) or (D,R) gives a higher payoff to both players.
However, this choice function cannot be Nash equilibrium behavior by any zero-sum
game. Assuming that the choices are Nash-equilibria of a zero-sum game, we have that
(U,L) is chosen from {(U,L), (D,L)} and (D,R) is chosen from {(D,L), (D,R)}. These
imply that for player 1, (U,L) is strictly preferred to (D,L); for player 2, (D,R) is
strictly preferred to (D,L), which implies player 1 strictly prefers (D,L) to (D,R). On
the other hand, since (D,R) is chosen from {(D,R), (U,R)} and (U,L) is chosen from
1This example is originally from Sprumont (2000). In his paper, the example was provided to show
how choice behavior appears to be Nash-rationalizable.
2
{(U,L), (U,R)}, for player 1, (D,R) is strictly preferred to (U,R); for player 2, (U,L)is
strictly preferred to (U,R), which implies player 1 strictly prefers (U,R) to (U,L). As a
result, these cyclic preference orders imply that all possible joint actions are indeed indif-
ferent for player 1 (and thus player 2 by the fact that the game is zero-sum). Therefore,
we would expect to see all strategy profiles chosen.
This example shows that once we have two choices on the diagonals in a table of
joint actions, in order for the joint choice function to be Nash equilibrium behavior
with a zero-sum game, the other pairs of actions also should be chosen. When a choice
behavior has the property that any pair of actions chosen, one for each player, is also
jointly chosen, we say that the choice behavior is interchangeable. Our main theorem
shows that this interchangeability of joint choice behavior is indeed the only additional
condition that distinguishes the testable implications of zero-sum games from those of
general non-cooperative games.
Since Samuelson introduced his analysis of revealed preference (Samuelson, 1938),
there have been a considerable number of research studies on the testable implications of
individual decision making. However, compared to the history and popularity of game
theory and the research devoted to refining solution concepts, the falsifiability of game
theoretic models has received scant attention. More recently, there have been several
studies on the testable implications of collective decision-making such as household be-
havior (Chiappori, 1988) and general equilibrium model (Brown and Matzkin, 1996).
In game theoretic setup, while Sprumont (2000) deals with simultaneous joint decision-
making, and therefore normal form games, Ray and Zhou (2001) consider the case in
which all observed joint choices involve sequential movement by players. They derive
conditions the choice behavior needs to satisfy in order to coincide with subgame per-
fect Nash equilibria under complete information. Subsequent work by Ray and Snyder
(2003) has consolidated these two independent rationalizability concepts into one con-
3
dition, which they call subgame-perfect consistency. For further references, we refer to
Carvajal, Ray, and Snyder (2004).
The following section begins with a brief summary of Sprumont (2000) and states the
additional condition for Nash-rationalization with zero-sum games. Section 3 discusses
possible difficulties in extensions of the main theorem and Appendix A is devoted to the
proof of the main theorem.
2 Model and main theorem
There are two players, 1 and 2. Let A1 and A2 be finite sets of actions that player 1 and
2 may conceivably choose in a game. A := A1 × A2 is the set of all conceivably possible
joint actions. Although each player has independent preference over joint actions, a
certain action profile is chosen by both players. The game theoretic model captures this
interdependent choice environment.
Following the classical revealed preference approach, suppose we observe choices when
two players play a game B = B1 × B2 where B1 ⊂ A1 and B2 ⊂ A2 are the sets of all
available actions for player 1 and 2. In this model, all choices that the players make in
each game can be summarized as a choice function.
Definition 1 Let A = {B = B1×B2|∅ 6= B ⊂ A} be the set of all non-empty Cartesian-
product sets included in A. A joint choice function f assigns to each B ∈ A a
nonempty set f(B) ⊂ B.
In the case where at most one player has more than one available action in B, we
say B is in a line. Depending on the player, the line is either a column or a row - the
former when player 1 has choices, the latter when player 2 has choices. In addition, for
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any B
′′
⊂ B and B
′′
∈ A , we call B
′′
a subgame of B. For any B,B
′
∈ A , define B ∨B
′
as the set of all possible pairs of actions from Bi, B
′
i, (i = 1, 2). That is,
B ∨B
′
:=
∏
i=1,2
(Bi ∪B
′
i)
As in Sprumont (2000), we assume that all players make choices simultaneously and
the choice function is possibly multi-valued. In individual choice theory, a choice function
from a set of alternatives is called rationalizable if there exists a binary relation, R, such
that the choice agrees with the maximal set in R. The following definitions are the
counterparts of rationalizability in game theory. Compared to abstract individual choice
theory, which is based on a set of alternatives subject to a single binary relation, we
have a set of alternative strategy profiles and two binary relations. We assume that the
relations (say ) have the following properties, and are termed weak orders.
i. Complete: For all joint choices a, b ∈ A, a  b or b  a.
ii. Transitive: For all a, b, c ∈ A for which a  b and b  c, it follows that a  c.
Definition 2 A joint choice function f is Nash-rationalizable if there are two weak
orders 1,2 on A such that, for each B ∈ A , f(B) coincides with the set of all Nash
equilibria of the game (B,1,2).
Sprumont (2000) introduces the following two conditions for Nash-rationalizability.
These conditions are extended versions of Chernoff, expansion, and Sen’s β in individual
choice theory. When the feasible actions are restricted to lines, “Persistence under Ex-
pansion” is exactly the same as expansion and “Persistence under Contraction” is exactly
the same as Chernoff and Sen’s β.
Definition 3 A joint choice function over A is
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• Persistent under Expansion (PE): For all B,B
′
∈ A , f(B) ∩ f(B
′
) ⊂ f(B ∨ B
′
).
• Persistent under Contraction (PC):
(PC1) : For all B,B
′
∈ A with B
′
⊂ B, f(B) ∩B
′
⊂ f(B
′
).
(PC2) : Moreover, if B is in a line, B′ ⊂ B and f(B) ∩ B
′
6= ∅ implies f(B
′
) ⊂
f(B).
With these two conditions, Sprumont (2000) establishes the following theorem.
Theorem 4 A joint choice function f is Nash-rationalizable if and only if it satisfies
(PE) and (PC).2
From this model of Nash-rationalizability, we restrict the set of available rationalizing
games from the set of all non-cooperative games to include only zero-sum games. Under
the conditions of zero-sum games, the preferences of two players conflict in the opposite
direction. Therefore, while a general non-cooperative game consists of two weak orders,
we can describe zero-sum games with a single weak order.
Definition 5 Let  be a weak order over A. The game defined by (A,,) is called a
two-person zero-sum game, where  is the inverse relation of .3 We say that a
joint choice function f is Nash-rationalizable with a zero-sum game if there is a
weak order  on A such that for each B ∈ A , f(B) coincides with the set of all Nash
equilibria of the game (B,,).
As demonstrated in Example 1, not all Nash-rationalizable joint choice functions are
Nash-rationalizable with zero-sum games. In the example, we need at least one additional
2In Sprumont (2000), this theorem holds for any n-agent joint choice.
3Let  be a binary relation over A. Inverse relation  is defined as,
For all a, b ∈ A for which a  b, b  a.
Later, we will use the fact that the inverse relation of a weak order is also a weak order. The proof is
straightforward by definition.
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condition which fills the gap in the product space of two distinct choices in the diagonal of
the game table. This condition requires that the joint choice function is interchangeable.
Definition 6 (Interchangeable choice function) A joint choice function f over A
is interchangeable if for all B ∈ A and all b∗, b
′
∗
in f(B), {b∗} ∨ {b
′
∗
} ⊂ f(B).
Provided that agents play a zero-sum game and observed joint actions are the Nash-
equilibria of the corresponding subgame, the choice function is interchangeable. It is
well-known that any pair of equilibrium strategies of a zero-sum game, one for each
player, is an equilibrium strategy profile (see Luce and Raiffa (1957)). Our contribution
is to show that interchangeable choice behavior is indeed the only additional condition
which distinguishes zero-sum games from general non-cooperative games. The following
theorem summarizes this result.
Theorem 7 A joint choice function defined on a set of two-agent actions is Nash-
rationalizble with a zero-sum game if and only if it satisfies (PE), (PC), and inter-
changeability.
Proof : See Appendix A.
3 Discussion
Sprumont only applies (PC2) for each line. Its only function is to guarantee transitivity.
From this observation, Sprumont introduces “quasi Nash-rationalizability” where a choice
function agrees with the set of Nash-equilibria of (B, (1,2)) for all B ∈ A, in which
(i)i=1,2 are P-acyclic binary relations on A (possibly non-transitive).
4 He proves that a
joint choice function is quasi Nash-rationalizable if and only if it satisfies (PE), (PC1).
4A binary relation  on A is P-acyclic if and only if,
For all a, b, c ∈ A for which a ≻ b and b ≻ c, ¬(c ≻ a).
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However, the following example shows that (PE), (PC1), and interchangeability are not
enough to induce quasi Nash-rationalizability with zero-sum games.
Example 8 5
Figure 2 describes a choice function f over all binary choices in A. The left figure is
for adjacent actions in the table and the right figure is for other binary choices. For each
column, a solid arrow implies that only one action is chosen against the other; a dashed
line implies that both are chosen. For example, {b} = f({b, a6}) and {a2, c} = f({a2, c}).
For each row, the arrow describes the choice inversely: e.g. {a4} = f({a3, a4}) and
{b, a4} = f({b, a4}). Assuming that f satisfies (PE) and (PC1), we can verify the choice
values for each 2× 2 subgames.6 For other subgames,
• {a2} = f(column 1 and 2), {a4} = f(column 2 and 3), and {b, a4} = f(column 1
and 3).
• {d, a4} = f(row 1 and 2), {a4} = f(row 2 and 3), and {c} = f(row 1 and 3).
• {a4} = f(A).
a1         a2                 d
 b      a3                 a4
a6      c           a5
a1         a2                 d
 b                       a4
a6      c           a5
Figure 2: Description of binary choice of f
5There is no simpler example with length less than 6. Note that we do not need (PC2) to rule out
a PR-cycle with length 4; P-cycle is a special case of PR-cycle. If we have P-cycle with length of 5, we
can reduce the cycle and generate a PR-cycle with length of 4. But again, this is ruled out by (PE),
(PC1) and interchangeability.
6If we illustrate them, {a2} = f({a1, a2, b, a3}), {d, a4} = f({a2, d, a3, a4}), {a3} = f({b, a3, a6, c}),
{a4} = f({a3, a4, c, a5}), {a2, c} = f({a1, a2, a6, c}), {c, a5} = f({a2, d, c, a5}), {a1, d, b, a4} =
f({a1, d, b, a4}), and {b, a4} = f({b, a4, a6, a5}).
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This choice function satisfies (PE), (PC1) and interchangeability. If we assume that
the choice function is Nash-rationalizable with a zero-sum game, (A,,), the choice
function should agree with  over all binary choices. However,  have a P-cycle, a1 ≻
a2 ≻ · · · ≻ a6 ≻ a1. Thereby the choice function can not be Nash-rationalizable with
any P-acyclic relation.

Note that (PE) and (PC1) guarantees that individual choices are P-acyalic. In a
general non-cooperative game, this is enough to guarantee the existence of P-acyclic re-
lations (i)i∈1,2 which rationalize the choice function. However, if we assume the game
is zero-sum, binary choices of one agent directly imply the relation of the other agent.
This effect induces a possible P-cycle across agents.
It is also restrictive to require observations for all possible subgames when we ap-
ply these testable implications. A natural relaxation is to assume that a choice func-
tion is defined on A
′
⊂ A. However, Sprumont comments on the difficulties in Nash-
rationalizability under incomplete observations. Without conditions for rationalizability
by general non-cooperative games, it looks even harder to find conditions for rationaliz-
ability with zero-sum games.
In classical choice theory, the congruence condition has been studied for incomplete
observations (see Richter (1971)). In particular, congruency is defined as the following.
Definition 9 For B ⊂ 2X and a choice function c : B −→ 2X\∅ such that f(B) ⊂ B,
define R
′
as,
For all x, y ∈ X, xR
′
y if ∃B ∈ B such that {x, y} ⊂ B and x ∈ c(B).
If R
′
is consistent, then the choice function is called congruent.7
7For the definition of consistency, see Definition 11.
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For individual choice behavior, Richter proves that a choice function is rationalizable
by a weak order if and only if it is congruent. However, the following example shows that
a naive extension of the congruence condition does not solve the incomplete observation
problem in joint behavior.
Example 10 (Individually congruent but not Nash-ratioinalizable) The conceiv-
able game is 2×3 where agent 1 can choose in {U,D} and agent 2 can choose in {L,M,R}.
Three figures show the only three observed games and the choices from them.
*
*
*
L  M M  R L  R
U
D
U
D
U
D
Figure 3: Individually congruent but not Nash-rationalizable
Assuming that the choice function satisfies (PC), we get {(U,L)} = f({(U,L), (U,M)})
and {(U,L)} = f({(U,L), (D,L)}) from the first subgame. Applying (PC) to other
games, we can verify all R
′
relations in definition 9 for each individual and see the choice
functions are congruent. However, assuming that these choices are Nash-rationalizable
with (A,1,2), we can derive (U,R) 2 (U,M) and (U,R) 1 (D,R) from the first and
third game. This contradicts the choice from the second game. 
This study still leaves out several issues arising from the characteristics of zero-sum
games. The first thing to note is that the proof relies on the existence of choice for all
B ∈ A. Considering that we verify the choice is Nash-rationalizable, this implies that
all subgames are required to have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. However, to the
best of our knowledge there are no theoretical conditions guaranteeing the existence of
pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a finite zero-sum game. Considering the absence of
conditions for pure strategy Nash equilibrium, an obvious direction of research would
10
investigate either mixed strategies or correlated strategies. However, necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for mixed or correlated strategy rationalizability are also unknown.
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Appendix A Proof of the main theorem
The necessity of (PE) and (PC) are obvious from the definition of Nash equilibrium.
Further, the necessity of interchangeability of choice functions are referred to in Luce
and Raiffa (1957) at p.66. In this paper, only the sufficiency of these three conditions is
proved by constructing a preference  over A with which for all B ∈ A , f(B) coincides
with the set of all Nash-equilibria of (B,,).
As in example 8, define two relations ∗ and ∗∗ as follows. For any a, b ∈ A,
a ∗ b if and only if a2 = b2 and a ∈ f({a1, b1} × {a2}),
a ∗∗ b if and only if a1 = b1 and b ∈ f({a1} × {a2, b2})
Note that ∗ and ∗∗ are disjoint. Finally, let  be the union of ∗ and ∗∗.8 In
each line, (PC) is equivalent to Chernoff and Sen’s β, and ∗ and ∗∗ are defined as
analogous with the base-relation. In such case, Sen (1971) showed that ∗ is a weak
order in each column, and ∗∗ is an inverse relation of a weak order in each row; thereby,
 is a weak order in both columns and rows. However,  is still incomplete across the
lines. Before we proceed with the construction of the weak order over A, we need some
preliminary definitions.
Definition 11 (Consistent relation) Let R be a relation overX = {x1, x2, . . . , xl, . . . }
and P be the strict counterpart of R. A sequence x1Rx2R · · ·RxlPx1 is called a PR-cycle
(or a cycle). If a relation does not have any cycle, we say that it is consistent.
8In individual choice theory, given a finite alternative set X = {x, y, . . . } and a choice function g, Sen
(1971) defines base-relation(R∗) as
xR∗y if and only if x ∈ g({x, y})
If we arrange player 1’s conceivable actions in a column and player 2’s actions in a row, thereby con-
structing a table of joint actions, ∗ represents the base-relation in each column and ∗∗ represents the
base relation in each row in the table, except ∗∗ is defined inversely as compared to the convention.
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Definition 12 (Extension) Given any arbitrary binary relation R on X, if R ⊂ R
′
is
such that
xRy implies xR
′
y
xPy implies xP
′
y
then R
′
is called an extension of R.
In the following, we show that  is consistent, and any weak order extension of 
Nash-rationalizes the joint choice function with a zero-sum game.
Lemma 13  is consistent.
Proof of Lemma 13 Suppose by means of contradiction that there exists {a1, · · · , aN} ⊂
A such that a1  a2  · · ·  aN ≻ a1. Since  is the union of two disjoint sets, ∗ and
∗∗, depending on whether {ai, aj} is in a column or a row,  is either ∗ or ∗∗.
Without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to cycles of even length, of length
at least 4, whereby the links in the cycle alternate between ∗∗ and ∗. In order to
see that we only need to consider cycles that alternate, note that any cycle containing
consecutive ∗ or ∗∗ can be reduced by means of transitivity to a shorter cycle without
consecutive relations. It is also straightforward to check that there are no cycles of length
2, such as a1 ∗ a2 ≻∗∗ a1. By definition of ∗, a12 = a
2
2 and by definition of 
∗∗, a11 = a
2
1,
which together imply that a1 = a2. However, then we have a1 ≻∗∗ a1, a contradiction.
Finally, we can rule out cycles that are of odd length, since we can shorten any cycle by
transitivity to a cycle of even length. For instance, the cycle a ∗∗ b ∗ c ∗∗ d ∗ e ≻∗∗ a
of length 5 can be reduced to the cycle b ∗ c ∗∗ d ∗ e ≻∗∗ b of length 4.
We demonstrate the case where the cycle begins with ∗∗, however, the case where
the cycle begins with ∗ is analogous. We show by induction that there does not exist a
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cycle of any length.
(i) (ii) (iii)
a b
cd
a b*
c
a
cd*
Figure 4: A cycle with length of 4
First, we show that there is no cycle with length of 4. Suppose a ∗∗ b ∗ c ∗∗ d ≻∗
a. By definition, we have a1 = b1, b2 = c2, c1 = d1 and d2 = a2. Then {a, b, c, d} makes
a game, depicted in Figure 4. In part (i) of the figure, each dashed arrow corresponds to
either ∗ or ∗∗ and the solid arrow corresponds to d ≻∗ a. The tail of each arrow is the
element from the left-hand side of the relation.
Parts (ii) and (iii) of the Figure 4 illustrate the choice function generating ∗ and ∗∗
for each subgame. Note that b ∈ f({a, b})∩f({b, c}), and d ∈ f({a, d})∩f({c, d}).9 Then
(PE) implies that b ∈ f({a, b, c, d}) and d ∈ f({a, b, c, d}). Since f is interchangeable, and
since a1 = b1 and a2 = d2, a = (b1, d2) must also be chosen, so that a ∈ f({a, b, c, d}).
Likewise, c = (d1, b2) implies c ∈ f({a, b, c, d}). Finally, (PC) then implies that a ∈
f({a, d}), which contradicts d ≻∗ a. So, there can not be any cycle of length 4.
Now, we make the induction hypothesis that there is no cycle of length 2(n−1) where
n ≥ 3. Given this hypothesis, we show that there is no cycle of length 2n.
By reordering the list of individual actions for player 1 and 2, from a cycle a1  a2 
· · ·a2n ≻ a1 , we can generate the table of joint actions in Figure 3. Here, the dashed
arrows and the solid arrow represent the links in the cycle as in Figure 2.
Proof by induction argument requires the steps described below here. Steps 1 to
3 give relations over a subset of B (Figure 10), and step 4 shows another subsets of
9Note that ∗∗ is defined inversely.
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a1
e
        
               a2n-4         c1
           d        a2n-3      a2n-2
a2n          ...            b2   b1      a2n-1
.
.
.
.
.
.
Figure 5: A cycle of length of 2n (n ≥ 3)
relations over B (Figure 12-(ii)). Step 5 induces the contradiction of these relations over
two subsets.
Step 1: Consider the subgame {a2n−3, a2n−2, a2n−1, b1}. In addition to the known re-
lations from the cycle, we can verify f({a2n−3, b1}) and f({b1, a2n−1)}. The four cases
in Figure 6 below contain all possible cases of f({a2n−3, b1}) and f({b1, a2n−1)}. In
these two subgames, it must not be the case that either a2n−3 ∈ f({a2n−3, b1}) and
a2n−1 ∈ f({b1, a2n−1} (fig (i)), or b1 ∈ f({a2n−3, b1}) and b1 ∈ f({b1, a2n−1}) (fig (ii)).
(i.)
         a2n-3 a2n-2
    a2n                b1 a2n-1  
(ii.)
         a2n-3 a2n-2
    a2n                b1 a2n-1  
(iii.)
         a2n-3 a2n-2
    a2n                b1 a2n-1  
(iv.)
         a2n-3 a2n-2
    a2n                b1 a2n-1  
Figure 6: A cycle with length 2n
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In case (i), a2n−4 ∗ b1 and b1 ∗∗ a2n by transitivity of ∗ in the left column,
and by transitivity of ∗∗ in the bottom row. These two relations induce the cycle
a1  · · ·  a2n−4  b1  a2n ≻ a1 which is length 2(n − 1). In case (ii), b1 ∈
f({a2n−3, b1}) ∩ f({b1, a2n−1}) and a2n−2 ∈ f({a2n−3, a2n−2}) ∩ f({a2n−2, a2n−1}). (PE)
induces a2n−2 and b1 are in f({a2n−3, a2n−2, a2n−1, b1}), and indeed all four joint actions
are in f({a2n−3, a2n−2, a2n−1, b1}) provided that f is interchangeable. Therefore, we have
an indifference relation ∼ in {a2n−3, b1} and {b1, a2n−1}, which gives a special case of (i).
Excluding case (i) and (ii), either (iii) or (iv) is true. We will prove that the induction
step is true in case (iii) and omit the case of (iv). The proof that the induction argument
is true under case (iv) is omitted here as it can be shown with exactly the same approach
as that taken with case (iii).
(i.)
         a2n-3 a2n-2
    a2n                b1 a2n-1  
a2n-4           c
(ii.)
         a2n-3 a2n-2
    a2n                b1 a2n-1  
a2n-4           c
(iii.)
         a2n-3 a2n-2
    a2n                b1 a2n-1  
a2n-4           c
(iv.)
         a2n-3 a2n-2
    a2n                b1 a2n-1  
a2n-4           c
Figure 7: More relations from f
Step 2: Figure 7 contains every possible case of f({a2n−4, c}) and f({c, a2n−2}). Using
the same argument that used for the case (i), (ii) of f({a2n−3, b1}) and f({b1, a2n−1}),
we can rule out the cases of (i) and (ii). In addition, case (iii), a2n−4 = f({a2n−4, c})
and c = f({c, a2n−2}), is not possible, either. This can be shown first by observing
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b1 ≻∗ a2n−4. If it is not the case, completeness of ∗ in the left column gives a2n−4 ∗ b1,
which, combined with b1 ∗∗ a2n by transitivity of ∗∗ in the bottom row, induces the
cycle a1 ∗∗ · · · ∗∗ a2n−4 ∗ b1 ∗∗ a2n ≻∗ a1 whose length is 2(n− 1).
Once (iii) and b1 ≻∗ a2n−4 are obtained (see Figure 8), consider the set of joint actions
{a2n−4, c, b1, a2n−1}. Any choice from this game violates the (PC) in one subgame of
{a2n−4, c, b1, a2n−1}. Suppose c ∈ f({a2n−4, c, b1, a2n−1}), then c /∈ f({a2n−4, c}) violates
(PC), and likewise any joint action in {a2n−4, c, b1, a2n−1} cannot be a choice. Thus the
case (iv), c = f({a2n−4, c}) and a2n−2 = f({c, a2n−2}), should be true.
(iii.)
         a2n-3 a2n-2
    a2n                b1 a2n-1  
a2n-4           c1
Figure 8: Ruling out the case (iii)
Step 3: Considering f({a2n−5, d}) and f({d, a2n−3}), we can rule out the cases of ei-
ther a2n−5 ∈ f({a2n−5, d}) and a2n−3 ∈ f({d, a2n−3}), or d ∈ f({a2n−5, d}) and d ∈
f({d, a2n−3}) by the same argument used for f({a2n−3, b1}) & f({b1, a2n−1}) and f({a2n−4, c})
& f({c, a2n−2}) in the previous steps. Accordingly, we only have cases of either a2n−5 =
f({a2n−5, d}) and d = f({d, a2n−3}), or d = f({a2n−5, d}) and a2n−3 = f({d, a2n−3}), case
(i) or case (ii) in Figure 9, respectively. However, case (i) is ruled out, because once we
have a2n−5 ≻∗ d, it must be a2n−2 ≻∗∗ d. If not, d ∗∗ a2n−2, then,
1. If the cycle is length 6 (a2n−5 is a1 and there is no # in the fig(i)), b2 is equal to
a2n. Thus we have a2n−1 ∗∗ b2 and b2 ≻∗ d by transitivity of ∗. As a result,
d ∗∗ a2n−2 makes a cycle with length 4, d ∗∗ a2n−2 ∗ a2n−1 ∗∗ b2 ≻∗ d, which
contradicts the induction hypothesis.
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a2n-5       a2n-4 c1
  d       a2n-3      a2n-2
  b2           b1            a2n-1 
#
a2n-5       a2n-4 c1
  d       a2n-3      a2n-2
  b2           b1            a2n-1 
(i.) (ii.)
Figure 9: Verifying more relations.
2. If the cycle is length 8 or more (there is a2n−6 , ‘#’ in the fig (i), which is not
a1), a2n−6 ∗ d ∗∗ a2n−2 by transitivity of ∗ and ∗∗ in the left column and
the middle row. These relations shorten the cycle, which contradicts the induction
hypothesis.
Therefore, in case (i), a2n−2 ≻∗∗ d must be true. However, regardless of what is in
f({a2n−5, d, c, a2n−2}), it violates (PC). For instance, if d ∈ f({a2n−5, d, c, a2n−2}) then it
must be d ∈ f({a2n−5, d}), which violates a2n−5 ≻∗ d. Consequently, (ii) in figure 9 must
be the case.
By applying steps 2 and 3 sequentially, we can verify more relations. Figure 10
summarizes the result of this process. In the following, step 4 is only for the cycle whose
length is greater than or equal to 8. For a cycle with length of 6, we already have all the
relations that we need to verify in step 4.
Step 4: Denote the joint action (a2n−11 , a
2(n−k)−1) as bk, the joint action (a
2(n−k−1)
1 , a
2(n−k)
2 )
as ck, where k = 1, 2, . . . , n− 2. Figure 10 shows how bi and ci, (1 ≤ i ≤ n − 2), are lo-
cated. Let τ be a function from {b1, b2, . . . , bn−2} to B such that, τ(bi) = (a
2n−(2i+1)
1 , b
i
2).
Figures 10,11, and 12 show how the function values are located in the game tables. In
this step, we show the following claim:
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a1
e
        
               a2n-4         c1
           d        a2n-3      a2n-2
a2n          ...            b2   b1      a2n-1
.
.
.
.
.
.
Figure 10: Verified relations by step 2 and 3.
Claim 14 For any bi (1 ≤ i ≤ n− 2), bi ≻ τ(bi) and bi ≻ a2n−1
Proof : We prove this claim by induction. Note that we already assumed that this is true
for b1 in step 2.
Induction 1: The claim holds for b2, that is b2 ≻∗ τ(b2) (or a2n−5) and b2 ≻∗∗ a2n−1.
(i.)
(ii.) (iii.)
     d     a2n-3          a2n-2
   a2n      b2            b1            a2n-1  
τ(b2)        a2n-4 c1
     d     a2n-3          a2n-2
   a2n      b2            b1            a2n-1  
τ(b2)        a2n-4 c1
     d     a2n-3          a2n-2
   a2n      b2            b1            a2n-1  
τ(b2)        a2n-4 c1
Figure 11: Verifying more relations involving b2.
Proof : Considering the subgames, {τ(b2), b2} and {b2, a2n−1} (see Figure 11), it
must not be the case that τ(b2) ∈ f({τ(b2), b2}) and a2n−1 ∈ f({b2, a2n−5}) (case
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(i)). Otherwise, it shortens the cycle with a2n−5 = τ(b2) ∗ b2 ∗∗ a2n (transitivity
in the bottom row is applied.) Therefore, by completeness in each line, we should
have either a2n−1 ≻∗∗ b2 or b2 ≻∗ τ(b2). In the former case, in order not to have a
cycle of length 6, which includes {τ(b2), a2n−4, a2n−3, a2n−2, a2n−1, b2}, f must give
τ(b2) ≻∗ b2 (fig (ii)) and in the latter case, in order not to have a cycle with length 6,
f must give b2 ≻∗∗ a2n−1 (fig (iii)). However, case (ii) is ruled out by considering the
subgame, {τ(b2), c1, b2, a2n−1}. To show this, observe that a2n−1 ≻∗ c1. Otherwise,
τ(b2) ∗∗ c1 ∗ a2n−1 shorten the cycle. If the case (ii) is true, then any choice from
{τ(b2), c1, b2, a2n−1} violates (PC). For example, if τ(b2) ∈ f({τ(b2), c1, b2, a2n−1}),
then it must be true that τ(b2) ∈ f({τ(b2), c1}), which contradicts to τ(b2) ≻∗∗ c1
(Note again that ∗∗ is defined inversely). Therefore, (iii) must be the case in
Figure 11.
Induction 2: If the claim is true for bm−2, it is also true for bm (3 ≤ m ≤ n− 2).
Proof : With the same approach as induction 1, f should not give τ(bm) ∗ bm and
bm ∗∗ a2n−1, otherwise we have a shorter cycle including τ(bm) ∗ bm ∗∗ a2n.
Thus, it must be either a2n−1 ≻∗∗ bm or bm ≻∗ τ(bm). In the former case, not to have
a cycle, bm ∗ τ(bm) ∗∗ · · · ∗ a2n−1 ≻∗∗ bm which is length 2m+ 2 ≤ 2(n− 1), it
must be true that τ(bm) ≻∗ bm(case (i))10, and in the latter case, not to have the
cycle, τ(bm) ∗∗ · · · ∗ a2n−1 ∗ bm ≻∗ τ(bm) which is length 2m+2 ≤ 2(n− 1), it
must be true that bm ≻∗∗ a2n−1(case (ii)). However, case (i) can be ruled out. First,
observe that bm−2 ≻∗ cm−1 must be true. Otherwise τ(bm) ∗∗ cm−1 ∗ bm−2 ∗∗
a2n induces a shorter cycle. In addition, transitivity of ∗∗ in the bottom row gives
bm−2 ≻∗∗ bm. Then, in the subgame, {τ(bm), bm, bm−2, cm−1}, any choice violates
(PC). Therefore, (ii) must be the case in f({τ(bm, bm}) and f({bm, a2n−1}).
10Although we explicitly write the proof only for the case of cycle begins with ∗∗, every single step
so far could have been reproduced in cases where cycles begin with ≻∗, analogously. Here, we used the
induction hypothesis, ‘there is no cycle of length 2(n − 1)’, from the counterpart proof of cycles begin
with ∗ and have a strong relation as ≻∗∗
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By induction, bi ≻ τ(bi) and bi ≻ a2n−1 for i = 1, . . . , n− 2, so claim 1 holds.
τ(b2)     cm-1
    ...
 bm   bm-1     bm-2               a2n-1
(i.)
τ(b2)     cm-1
    ...
 bm   bm-1     bm-2               a2n-1
(ii.)
Figure 12: Verifying relations involving bi
Step 5: Results from steps 2 and 3 and results from step 4 contradict each other.
  a1
  a2n      bn-2  ...       a2n-1
  e   τ(bn-2)    a4
.
.
.
.
.
.
Figure 13: Inducing a contradiction
Proof : If we denote the joint action (τ(bn−2)1, a
1
2) as e (see Figure 13), then step 2 and
3 gives e ≻∗ a1 and e ≻∗∗ τ(bn−2). We showed in step 4 that bn−2 ≻∗ τ(bn−2) and
bn−2 ≻∗∗ a2n−1. Moreover, it must be true that e ≻∗ a2n, otherwise, a2n ∗ e ≻∗∗ a4
shortens the cycle. On the other hand, bn−2 ≻∗∗ a2n, by transitivity of ∗∗ in the bottom
row. Lastly, we can observe that any choice from the subgame, {e, τ(bn−2), a2n, bn−2},
violates (PC), and this contradiction completes the proof of step 5, thereby completing
the proof of Lemma 13.
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Proof of main theorem
Claim 15 For all B ∈ A , f(B) coincides with the set of all Nash-equilibria of the game
(B,,).
Proof : Take any B = B1 × B2 ∈ A and let NE(B) be the set of all Nash-equilibria
of the game (B,,). First, to show f(B) ⊂ NE(B), take any b∗ = (b∗1, b
∗
2) ∈ f(B).
Since f satisfies (PC), b∗ ∈ f(B
′
) for all B
′
∈ A and B
′
⊂ B. Therefore, for any
{b∗, (b1, b
∗
2)} ⊂ B, b
∗ ∈ f({b∗, (b1, b
∗
2)}). By the definition of 
∗, we have b∗ ∗ (b1, b
∗
2),
which is equal to b∗  (b1, b
∗
2). Similarly, for any {b
∗, (b∗1, b2)} ⊂ B, b
∗ ∈ f({b∗, (b∗1, b2)}).
The definition of ∗∗ gives (b∗1, b2) 
∗∗ b∗, which is equal to (b∗1, b2)  b
∗, or b∗  (b∗1, b2).
Since b∗  (b1, b
∗
2) and b
∗  (b∗1, b2), for all (b1, b
∗
2) ∈ B and (b
∗
1, b2) ∈ B, b
∗ is a Nash-
equilibrium of the game (B,,).
Conversely, if b∗ ∈ NE(B), for any (b1, b
∗
2) ∈ B, b
∗  (b1, b
∗
2). Since, only 
∗ and
not ∗∗ is defined in columns, we have b∗ ∗ (b1, b
∗
2) and the definition of 
∗ gives
b∗ ∈ f({b∗, (b1, b
∗
2)}). Moreover, (PE) implies b
∗ ∈ f(B1 × {b
∗
2}) (∗). And b
∗ ∈ NE(B)
implies b∗  (b∗1, b2) for all (b
∗
1, b2) ∈ B (or (b
∗
1, b2)  b
∗). Since, only ∗∗ not ∗ is defined
in rows, we have (b∗1, b2) 
∗∗ b∗. The definition of ∗∗ gives b∗ ∈ f({b∗, (b∗1, b2)}) and (PE)
induces b∗ ∈ f({b∗1} × B2) (∗∗). Lastly, (∗), (∗∗), and (PE) imply that b
∗ ∈ f(B).
We have shown that  is consistent and f(B) coincides with NE(B) for all B ∈ A .
Suzumura (1976) shows that a consistent relation has a weak order extension. Observing
that the extension generates additional relations only between the joint choices which
are not in the same line, this extension does not affect the result of claim 15, so claim 15
is still valid with the weak order extension of . This completes the proof of the main
theorem.
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